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R evolutionary technological change on an exponentially growing scale is already here and mandates that the Army
institute a continuous transformation process that includes all areas of doctrine, training, leadership, organization, and
technology. The continuing wave of technological change is different from even the information technology revolution
of the 1990s in two ways. First, it is a vastly more profound transformation due to the synergy of three emerging
technologies: bio-engineering, nano-engineering, and robotics and artificial intelligence. Second, it is a revolution that
will occur at a speed never seen before. In only the past couple of decades has society begun to comprehend and
contemplate the implications of the apparent accelerating pace of change. This progress is not without its costs.
Technological innovation is the primary cause of a growing stress in society, where the basic human desire for the
comfort of permanence is in direct opposition to a deep need to control and transform the environment in the service
of humanity. Technological innovation continually remakes the world and is central to the economic process and
cultural beliefs—commonly labeled progress—that drive modern civilization. Yet, it is this need for progress that is the
source of the relentless destabilization and disorder experienced by individuals, institutions, governments, and
societies. 1
The purpose of this article is to investigate three questions that are critical to the future of the US Army. First, what
can be anticipated regarding the nature and pace of future technological change? Second, why is it important for the
Army to continuously transform itself in response to increasingly rapid change?
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Finally, how could the Army respond to this change to manage the growing stress and to balance the need for
organizational continuity against the requirement for the constant improvement of effectiveness to assure national
security? Broad recommendations to create a continuous transformation process and to link technological innovation
to desired institutional outcomes will be offered.
Very little effort has been made to understand the interactions between the technological innovations required for
progress and the institutional responses ensuing from these innovations. Bear in mind, the sole purpose of
technological progress should be the advancement of society in general or, in the case of military technology, the
strengthening of total military effectiveness. Therefore, the design of technological innovations must not be merely
aimed at the enhancement of technological performance; rather, the technology must be purposefully created to
produce a desired overall outcome in the Army and the nation when combined with social, political, and economic
factors.
What are the technologies driving much of the change in today’s globally connected world, and how fast is this change

occurring? The current rate of technological change will be briefly examined by observing the speed of change in
several different coarse measures of progress. Next, the logic of exponential change will be considered, and why this
characteristic of change is only now being recognized. The implications of the accelerating pace of technological
progress are far-reaching for all organizations, and the Army cannot escape the dire consequences of failing to adapt.
Emerging Technologies
My intention is not to predict the particular innovations that will power social and military change for the next 15 to 20
years. However, brief descriptions of the technologies currently thought to have the greatest potential to produce the
innovations that will change the world are necessary to consider their links to Army transformation. At present, broad
agreement exists among experts about the general direction of the evolution of technology, and it involves three central
areas: bio-engineering, nanoscale engineering, and robotics and artificial intelligence.2
Thanks to the sequencing of the human genome, we now have access to the blueprints for constructing a biological
entity. Therefore we are at the early stages of learning how to make constructive modifications to that entity. This
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knowledge paves the way for individualized drug therapies, noninvasive surgery, tissue and organ engineering, neural
and sensory implants, and countless currently inconceivable possibilities. It is clear that the quality and length of
human life will be significantly increased, and the unmistakable potential exists to improve all areas of human
performance.3
The suddenly emerging field of nanoscale engineering, or nanotechnology, is also a rapidly expanding arena which
deals with structures and machines on the atomic and molecular scale. These nano-structures include electrical,
mechanical, mechanical-electrical, and quantum devices with the promise to revolutionize the ways we develop and
manufacture technology and interact with the environment.4 Potential capabilities include the proliferation of sensors
and actuators leading to “clothes that respond to the weather, interface with information systems, monitor vital signs,
deliver medicines, and automatically protect wounds; airfoils that respond to airflow; buildings that adjust to the
weather; bridges and roads that sense and repair cracks” and so on.5
The concept of molecular manufacturing requires the solution of several key technical problems, but it offers immense
potential to transform manufacturing and resolve environmental problems at the same time. The idea is to build
structures and machines from the inside out, atom by atom, or molecule by molecule. Practically no manufacturing
waste is generated and almost anything, including a diamond rocket engine, is seemingly possible. This manufacturing
task would require molecular-scale assemblers to first replicate themselves and create a critical mass of assemblers that
would permit complete fabrication of any desired part or entire assembly within a reasonable period of time. 6
Microelectromechanical systems, the next size up from nanotechnology, are currently used in a variety of applications,
including triggering auto airbags, switching data moving over fiber-optic cables, and directly integrating with analog
and digital circuits on silicon chips as in a cellular telephone. As published recently in Physics Today, “the field of
micromechanics will change the paradigm of what machines are, how and where we use them, what they cost, and
how we design them. It may not be an exaggeration to say that we are on the verge of a new industrial revolution
driven by a new and completely different class of machines.”7
The steady shrinkage of electronic components will persist into the era of nanoelectronics and permit the processing
power of computers to increase beyond that of the human brain. Computers already indirectly augment the processing
capability of the human brain today, just as a word processing program helps to correct a writer’s spelling errors. For
many years, technology has provided replacements for bones and joints, reinforcement of sight and hearing, and the
support of damaged organs. Direct augmentation of human memory and mental processing through implanted
connections to a computer will be just a natural extension of current trends. 8 Extreme miniaturization will enable
people and machines to interact in ways that cannot even be imagined now, except in the minds of inspired futurists. 9
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In this age of accelerating technological advances, it is difficult to stay abreast of the myriad of recent developments.
Some of the major and minor current innovations include noninvasive surgery, quantum computing, cochlear “bionic
ear” implants that allow deaf people to hear, micro-turbines, single-electron circuits, computers that can learn, search
and rescue robots, cells manipulated by micro-machines, proteins engineered for computer memory, bio-engineered
agriculture, autonomous aerial vehicles, and atomic force microscopes. And this list only scratches the surface.
Unfortunately, technology is always a double-edged sword. As it becomes more capable of providing positive benefits
for society, technology also acquires more potential for injury and destruction. In the wake of the September 2001
terrorist attacks, the consideration of public safety in the innovation of new technologies has become a higher priority
because the assumptions have changed. In some cases, public safety will demand a benign destruct mode for the
technology. In other cases, access to the technology may be severely restricted, and prudent ethical standards for
design engineers must be well thought-out and rigorously adopted.
How Fast is Technology Advancing?
Observations of change over the past century indicate that technology is evolving exponentially, which means change
is accelerating or the rate of change is increasing. As will be shown, exponential change does not provide individuals
or institutions a great deal of time to react, and therefore can be substantially disruptive to the unprepared. What is
exponential change and how does it differ from the commonly held view that the rate of change stays reasonably
constant?
Exponential growth represents the same model of change as the concept of compound interest in understanding the
time value of money. Many investors probably recall that money invested at a seven percent rate of return will double
every ten years, and ten percent compound interest doubles money in seven years. It is often convenient to describe
exponential change in terms of the doubling period. Consider starting with one dollar and investing it at 70 percent
interest versus adding $1,000 to the initial dollar every year for 20 years. Which option would you select? In the linear
case of adding $1,000 each year, one would have $20,001 after 20 years, while with exponential growth the initial one
dollar account doubles every year and after just 20 years has grown to more than one million dollars.
In the case of technological progress, the history of the growth of several different indicators in this century has been
observed to discern the mode of change. If we examine the mode of change of key measures over time, all
demonstrate roughly exponential growth at different rates. Since 1950 manufacturing productivity has increased at a
rate of 2.84 percent, but since 1982 the rate of growth has averaged 3.62 percent per year, and since 1992, when
information technology began to affect the economy, productivity has increased at a rate of 4.27 percent yearly.10
Another strong measure of technological innovation is the
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number of patents granted per year by the US Patent Office.11 Since 1790, the number has grown at an astonishing rate
of 5.15 percent, and although the rate from 1950 to 2000 slowed to 2.54 percent, it has once again averaged 5.27
percent since 1982. The US gross domestic product (GDP) has also grown at approximately an exponential rate, with a
6.33 percent rate of increase since 1929, and this rate has held steady over the last 71 years.12 Even if population
growth 13 is accounted for by considering the change in per capita US GDP, the growth rate is still a very strong 5.2
percent. Notwithstanding that these growth rates are not precisely exponential, in all cases they are clearly not linear.
The highest exponential growth has been in the increase of computers connected to the internet, which has grown at a
rate of close to 70 percent per year for more than 30 years.14
This very high accelerated growth can be seen in numerous other individual technologies, particularly in the
information technology field, but can we use the data to estimate the aggregate growth of technology in the 21st
century? Exponential growth is clearly a credible model of the change in these metrics, and if further metrics were
examined, as others such as Ray Kurzweil have done, exponential growth would be commonly observed in the change
of many more measures of technological evolution. 15

Then again, one might ask at this point about such technologies as automobiles, airplanes, bicycles, the can opener, the
mouse trap, and many others that have appeared to advance little over the last few years, much less exponentially. The
history of technological advance is the story of countless diverse technologies erupting exponentially on the scene and
then leveling off in growth or improvement in what is classically known as an S-shaped or logistic curve of growth. 16
However, it is the summation of all technologies that is of interest here, and that summation presents an overall picture
of accelerating change. This aggregate of technologies is probably best represented by the change in America’s GDP,
which has been doubling every 11 years since 1929. Consequently, exponential change appears to be a compelling
model for understanding and possibly even forecasting the accelerating advance of technology.
Why Do We Perceive Change as Linear?
Why at this point in human history are we only now perceiving this exponential nature of technological change, and
what is the approximate rate of progress of the totality of technology? With regard to the first part of the question,
exponential change processes tend to sneak up on and surprise the unsuspecting observer. If the doubling period of
change is very long, especially in comparison to the human life span, it is extremely difficult to notice any change at
all. Biological evolution is a good example, where the doubling period of biological complexity is probably measured
in millions of years. Only by careful study of the fossil record has it been possible to comprehend the unmistakable
exponential nature of biological evolution. Before the Industrial Revolution, technological change over a normal
human life span of about 40 years was almost nonexistent. Due to the long
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doubling periods, or slow growth rates of most change processes, exponential change in the past has not been easily
discerned through experience.
Even today, our awareness of change will naturally tend to be averaged over the doubling period of the change and,
therefore, cause it to appear to be approximately linear. Additionally, during the first few doubling periods of any
exponential change process, it is difficult to sense rapid change. To return to the example noted earlier, the first six
doubling periods of a one dollar investment earning 70 percent interest would produce only $64, not a very noteworthy
sum, especially compared to the linear process result of $6,001. Ray Kurzweil estimates the doubling period of overall
technological progress during the 20th century to be about ten years, equivalent to a seven percent rate of growth. 17
This seems like a reasonable rate of progress and is only slightly below the historical long-term average growth rate of
the stock market during the past century.18 Accordingly, the technological changes in the first six or seven decades of
the 20th century, although substantial, did not seem to be occurring at an accelerating rate, because the total change
was still relatively minor. However, in the last decade of the 20th century, more technological progress occurred than
was experienced in the entire first nine decades of the century, and now many began to take notice.
Why is technological change exponential? All evolutionary change is roughly exponential because the change builds
upon what has come before it. Population growth may be a helpful analogy: the more rabbits that are born, the more
rabbits exist to produce other offspring, which in turn will create more rabbits, and without any constraint on the
reproductive process the population increases exponentially. The creation of technology by engineers implies the
creation of tools and the discovery of knowledge that can be used to produce ever more complex and capable tools
upon which to create ever more advanced technology. As information technology provides greater and faster access to
knowledge, it also provides an easier and faster means to acquire the information needed to design further
technologies. Today, sophisticated computer software running on the latest computer hardware actually designs the
next generation of ever more capable and complex computer hardware. New innovations build on old innovations
exponentially.
Technological Progress: Past and Future
Consider the extent of technological progress that occurred in the 20th century and compare that to the technological
progress that will be achieved in the 21st century if exponential change continues. As cited earlier, the doubling period
for technological evolution during the 20th century is considered to be about ten years. In the first half of the last
century, technology evolved over five doubling periods to become 32 times more advanced, or more complex, or more

important in the life of humans in 1950 than it was in 1900. Now continue the doubling of progress every ten years
during the later half of the century, and by the year 2000 technology had become about 1,000 times more advanced, or
more important in our lives, than in 1900.
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What will technological evolution be like in the 21st century? By 2010, technology will have doubled again to become
2,000 times more advanced than in 1900, which means that we will experience the same level of technological change
in the first decade of the 21st century that we experienced in all of the 20th century! That’s a staggering thought. When
this exponential evolution is extrapolated to the end of the 21st century, one can project that in 2100, technology will
have progressed to become a million times more advanced than the technology that existed in 1900. In other words,
during the 21st century we will experience a thousand times the technological progress achieved in the 20th century.
Some experts believe that technological progress is even faster than exponential and that the doubling time of
technological growth is getting smaller, thus the prediction of a thousand times the progress of the last century in the
next may actually be an underestimation. 19
Two important lessons can be drawn from this discussion of exponential change. First, change is not going to stop,
and second it is going to come at society— and at the Army—at a faster and faster rate. If the Army is not prepared,
we will only be able to react, and by the time we have responded we will be even further behind the next wave of
change and very quickly left in the dust of accelerating change. The key to successful adaptation to change will be a
continuous transformation process that constantly redesigns the Army to be a near optimum force under any
circumstances. To understand how this might be accomplished, it will be helpful to look at how past military
technological innovations have been accommodated.
Studies of the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s show that new technological innovations will be successful
when they produce corresponding innovations in the synthesis of doctrine, training, leadership, and organization with
new technology. The creation of an all-encompassing integrated process for military innovation in the 21st century will
demand extensive cultural changes in how the Army does business and even in the moral factors of our world view.
As Williamson Murray and Allan Millett have noted: “Sheer technical innovation . . . does not win wars. Instead, the
interaction of technical change and organizational adaptation within a realistic strategic assessment determines whether
good ideas turn into real military capabilities.”20
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As defined by MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, military revolutions in the past, as opposed to revolutions in
military affairs, have transformed with startling speed and force all aspects of war, from policy and strategy to tactics,
and they predict that change of this magnitude is likely in the 21st century.21 All the signs of accelerating technological
change point toward a recasting of society and a military revolution rather than a more incremental “revolution in
military affairs.”22 Although Knox and Murray imply that the direction, consequences, and implications of a military
revolution are largely unpredictable, it is the professional duty of military leaders to design and implement a change
process as well as a fresh military culture that will produce a superior Army relative to any prospective challengers to
US national security.
Applying this to Army Transformation
Change is coming, it is coming faster than nearly everyone expects, and nothing can be done to stop it. The only
sensible response is to enthusiastically embrace change and use it to our advantage to improve overall organizational
effectiveness better and faster than the competition. This is considerably easier said than done, but the scale and speed
of change that we are facing require an entirely new process to wring from it the most organizational improvement
possible. Thankfully, the Army already has recent experience with innovative changes driven by information
technology and the Army Transformation initiative. The change process has not been smooth, timely, or innovative,
however. Consequently, Army Transformation, while a step in the right direction, is not yet the defining icon of the
future Army that it should become. Why do we need to prepare any differently than we have in the past? Because the
speed and magnitude of 21st-century technological change are very different from past engines of change, requiring

inventive, inclusive, and significantly more effective transformation processes.
The world economy is beginning to adjust to a climate of incessant change, which is reflected in the revolutionary
ways in which business organizations and the entire business culture have evolved over the past two decades. Of
course, the Army has also been adjusting not only to the evolution of technology but also to a vastly altered national
security environment. However, the time pressures have not been nearly as imposing, and the stimulus, without a
credible threat to national security, not nearly as compelling as in the business marketplace. The terrorists attacks of 11
September have gone a long way to resolve the stimulus problem, but on the other hand, they may further constrain
and confound the Army Transformation process. At the same time, American society is changing at an increasing pace,
and the Army that safeguards that society must change in parallel to avoid becoming irrelevant to the citizens it is
pledged to defend.
A major consequence of an inadequate transformation process would be the inability to protect against advanced
technology in an opponent’s hands that could be brought to bear against the nation, even if in just a single narrow
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technical domain such as bio-engineered weapons. Only by making the effort to remain at the cutting edge of science
and technology advances across all fields can the Army understand what is currently possible and what the near future
may hold in terms of weapons that can threaten US national security. As technologies are being adapted for military
use, the protections or counters to the employment of these technologies have to be developed in parallel. In other
words, the design of any military technology is not complete until a defense against it or a way to neutralize it has also
been created.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 also brought home the stark realization that even nonmilitary technology can be turned
into devastating weapons in ways that were never considered during the design of that technology. A fundamental
assumption for designing safe technology has always been that the operators of these tools would not do anything to
knowingly jeopardize their own existence. That assumption no longer applies. Large airliners must now be designed to
prevent a hijacker from intentionally turning one into a piloted cruise missile. The design of all future technology must
consider the possibility of deliberate attempts to convert the new tools into impromptu weapons. The dark side of these
new technologies almost certainly offers the greatest uneasiness for the Army’s ability to provide for national security.
Since the quality of our military force is only as good as the quality of the leaders and soldiers who are attracted to the
organization, the Army should be seen as a breeding ground for leaders and citizens who can thrive in an era of rapid
change and thus can assure the future of this nation and the global community. High-quality young men and women
should envision an assignment with the Army as an opportunity to serve with a world-class organization that can
handle the ambiguity and chaos of the future, an organization that gives them the opportunity to develop themselves
into the valuable leaders sorely needed both in and out of the military.
A further consequence of inadequate transformation would be the loss of the genuine dissuasive power ensuing from
the knowledge that the US Army is the world’s most technologically advanced and powerful military force.
Conventional wars normally occur only between nations or entities that have comparable military capabilities, and a
potential opponent would be very hesitant to trigger military action with the sure knowledge that it is inferior to the
United States in terms of military effectiveness. Of course, this embodies all areas of technology, because potential
opponents cannot be allowed to discern any asymmetric Achilles’ heel in our military capabilities.
Continuous Transformation Is Not Optional
The essence of the military profession is preparedness. Since only a small portion of a soldier’s career might be spent
in actual combat, for the vast majority of the time soldiers are engaged in preparation for war. Consequently, military
leaders should be the most capable of all professionals in preparing their
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organization for the incredible future ahead. However, since soldiers may be called to war unpredictably, and because

the fate of the nation may hinge on their abilities, it is very difficult and risky to make revolutionary or even
evolutionary change with the certainty that military effectiveness will be improved. Today, the fast-approaching future
requires continuous change and the greater risk would be in not changing. But, it is not entirely clear that the Army
can successfully adjust to this new imperative.
The defining characteristic of the best organizations over the next 20 years will be the capacity to transform
themselves faster than their competition, so they might take advantage of the unrelenting acceleration of technological
progress. The challenge of the military transformation process is to respond to change in such a way as to enhance the
overall effectiveness of the military to perform all assigned missions. This does not imply that the military
performance of technological innovations will be maximized. It means that overall military effectiveness will be
improved by the successful integration of the innovation with all aspects of military effectiveness: doctrine, training,
leadership, organization, and technology.
What might the design of an Army Continuous Transformation program for the incorporation of technological
innovations to produce improved overall military effectiveness look like? Consider a process based on a structure
labeled “Real-Time Technology Assessment,” originally conceived to enhance the societal value of research-based
innovation. 23 Army Continuous Transformation would integrate science and engineering research with studies of
doctrine, training, leadership, and organization to appreciably enhance the overall military value of technological
innovations. The major components of this Army Continuous Transformation model include the following.

• Historical studies of past transformational innovations to create models for predicting the interactions of all
components of military effectiveness.

• Research program mapping to monitor and assess current research and development activities at the Army, Defense
Department, national, and international levels. 24

• Communication and early warning to address and enhance the quality of the communication of scientific, technical,
and military developments; to facilitate the identification of Army priorities; to foster greater knowledge and more
effective communications between all the military effectiveness components; and to encourage the development of a
more open process of technological integration.

• Technology assessment and decisionmaking to assess the potential military effectiveness impacts and outcomes of
technical innovation; to develop a scenario-based, methodical process for identifying potential beneficial and
undesirable effects of a specific technology and for planning options to enhance desirable impacts and mitigate
undesirable ones; to make informed decisions; to reflectively assess Army Continuous Transformation for the purpose
of process improvement.
95/96
Such a continuous transformation process requires an entirely new approach to thinking about and improving the
military effectiveness of the Army. The biggest challenge is to reorient the technology design process for the Army so
that all components of military effectiveness are synergistically blended into an integrated design methodology to
produce the greatest overall increase in effectiveness. This process would involve tradeoffs among the elements of
doctrine, training, leadership, organization, and technology to optimize the full integration of capabilities to produce
the greatest military force.
Several major obstacles would have to be overcome to implement this Army Continuous Transformation process. I
know of no large-scale, integrated process, cutting across all parts of the Army and seeking input from all Army
commands and staffs, that has been implemented in the past. The Army’s authoritarian command culture, while
indispensable in combat, can be an impediment to open discussion of fundamental issues at all levels of the
organization. All Army soldiers and the US public will be stakeholders in this most fundamental and vital
organizational process, and they should be given the opportunity to contribute to the discussion in a systematic manner.

More formal transformation working groups would need to be organized from each of the major military communities,
such as the Training and Doctrine Command, Army Materiel Command, Forces Command, and others. Any
implementation plan would necessitate a pilot continuous transformation project that tackled a technical innovation
issue with great potential for success, and would also have the charter to scrutinize and improve the process.
The one indispensable aspect of a continuous process that will also be the most difficult to achieve is the close
collaboration of scientists, engineers, strategists, historians, national security experts, operators, doctrine creators,
trainers, logisticians, soldiers, and the public. If each community brings its own particular community goals and
objectives to the process in a defensive manner, the collaboration and thus continuous transformation will fail. On the
other hand, if all participants earnestly agree that the clear vision and goals of the Army are preeminent, not their
personal or individual community goals, then serious constructive collaboration is not out of the question.
Tradeoff analyses among competing design factors are difficult to conduct without some common measures of
effectiveness. Recently there have been some efforts to develop metrics for analyzing information operations, and this
work could be expanded to provide high-quality, validated metrics for assessing military effectiveness in a variety of
operations and environments. 25 Metrics only help to inform the decisionmakers; they do not make the decisions.
However, it is impossible to move an organization in a desired direction without a rough knowledge of where it
currently is, what is the desired direction of movement, and how far along the desired path the organization has moved
at any point in time.
One particular advantage currently exists to speed the implementation of an Army Continuous Transformation, and
that is the current Army Objective
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Force Task Force. This office could be the predecessor of a small permanent organization working directly for the
Army Chief of Staff to coordinate the process. Since the Army leadership recognizes the need for transformation to a
future force, the leap to a continuous transformation process is smaller than it otherwise might have been. However,
two serious obstacles must be overcome before the Army can become the world’s preeminent institution at adapting to
change. The first hurdle is the capacity to develop the culture of a true learning organization that values intellectual
curiosity and innovation at all levels. To surmount the second barrier, Army leaders must learn to use new skills and
concepts to lead in an increasingly complex world.
Leading in a Complex World
At the beginning of the 21st century, we find that our technologies, economy, and society are so complex that it is
impossible for any single individual to fully understand them. Yet even with this limitation, the leaders of the military,
government, and business communities can still effectively function, compete, and improve their abilities to achieve
objectives. How is this possible? The principal reason for their success is organizational networks that can blend the
diverse knowledge of their distinct members into skillful solutions and, just as importantly, continuously adapt to
changing knowledge requirements. Networks are not located on the traditional organizational chart, and they blur the
boundaries between the normally unconnected public and private sectors. Therefore, management at every level of
complex organizations is increasingly accomplished on a daily basis “by self organizing systems that both defy
centralized management and have changed the meaning of individual accountability.”26
Today and in the future, innovation in complex organizations derives from “the ability to routinely produce new and
enhanced technological processes and products by combining components and knowledge in ways that deliver
synergism.”27 This evolving ability to innovate at a different level has contributed to the current era of powerful
change, characterized by both increasing complexity and rate of change.
What are the implications of increasing complexity for the Army? First, it must be recognized that networks are the
innovators of complex technologies because of their ability to connect the diverse individuals, groups, and
organizations—both public and private—with the abilities and knowledge required for innovation. Only networks can
provide access to the wide-ranging knowledge domains required, and only self-organizing networks can provide the

intimate interactions among the organizational participants that permit the synthesis of this knowledge. This is not the
rigid, hierarchical, traditional military organizational structure. Dynamic, self-organizing networks not accounted for
on the wiring diagrams must be cultivated and nurtured if military innovation is to flourish. These types of networks
are not entirely new to the Army. As a result of our personnel rotation policies, many extensive networks of
individuals within and out97/98
side the military are created. Boundaries are more blurred than ever, and our policies must recognize the dysfunctional
nature of traditional barriers that separate organizations and roles. Complexity has generated many new ways to
consider how organizations operate and how innovation is developed. The most successful future policies will be those
that pursue adaptation and innovation through trial and error. 28 Can the military culture adapt?
Further Thoughts
More elemental than just implementing a quality process for continuously transforming the Army is the cultural
conversion that must accompany this change process for it to become genuinely valued by the profession. This cultural
conversion is best exemplified by the concept of a “learning organization,” recently heralded by the business
community. According to David Garvin of the Harvard Business School, “A learning organization is an organization
skilled at creating, acquiring, interpreting, transferring, and retaining knowledge, and at purposefully modifying its
behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights.”29 Army Continuous Transformation could be a process for
developing the Army into a preeminent learning organization that puts great value in the pursuit and application of
knowledge across all disciplines. Professional education is the best means to effect a cultural change. As General Hugh
Shelton, retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote recently, “Transformation is first and foremost an
intellectual exercise, requiring the brightest minds actively engaged in taking our armed forces to new and higher
levels of effectiveness. Therefore, the road to transformation begins with a strong program of education and leader
development.”30
The professional military culture places great value on action and generally disdains process. Only comfortable when
acting, we feel guilty if valuable time is given over to reflection. Rather, we are focused almost totally on the end
result, the final product. If we are to progress successfully, the balance between product and process needs to shift in
the future toward process, and we need to trust that a high-quality process will produce a high-quality product or
performance.
As military professionals, all Army leaders are committed to the continuous improvement of the entire Army to
achieve the commonly recognized goals associated with the Army Vision. With this responsibility in mind, only some
form of an Army Continuous Transformation process has the capability to deliver that vision. The bare outline of a
candidate process has been presented. Continual transformation is the key to maintaining the world’s best military
force in the face of accelerating technological change. Developing an unsurpassed process of unending transformation
of our military forces will be the single most important factor in protecting the nation for the foreseeable future.
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